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MESSAGE FROM THE TASK FORCE CO-CHAIRS
We are pleased to present the Preliminary Report on Race and
Washington’s Criminal Justice System, authored by the Research
Working Group of the Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice
System. The Research Working Group’s mandate was to investigate
disproportionalities in the criminal justice system and, where
disproportionalities existed, to investigate possible causes. This factbased inquiry was designed to serve as a basis for making
recommendations for changes to promote fairness, reduce disparity,
ensure legitimate public safety objectives, and instill public confidence
in our criminal justice system.
The Task Force came into being after a group of us met to discuss
remarks on race and crime reportedly made by two sitting justices on the
Washington State Supreme Court. This first meeting was attended by
representatives from the Washington State Bar Association, the
Washington State Access to Justice Board, the commissions on Minority
and Justice and Gender and Justice, all three Washington law schools,
leaders from nearly all of the state’s specialty bar associations, and other
leaders from the community and the bar.
We agreed that we shared a commitment to ensure fairness in the
criminal justice system. We developed working groups, including the
Research Working Group, whose Preliminary Report finds that race and
racial bias affect outcomes in the criminal justice system and matter in
ways that are not fair, that do not advance legitimate public safety
objectives, and that undermine public confidence in our criminal justice
system.
All of our working groups—Oversight, Community Engagement,
Research, Recommendations/Implementation, and Education—are
coordinating together to develop solutions. We are fortunate to have the
formal participation of a broad range of organizations and institutions,
with each week bringing new participants. We also have many people
contributing in an individual capacity, including many judges.
We have come together to offer our time, our energy, our expertise,
and our dedication to achieve fairness in our criminal justice system.
Sincerely,
Justice Steven C. González,
Past Chair, Washington State Access to Justice Board
Professor Robert S. Chang,
Director, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality
Co-Chairs, Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System

04 - WLR March 2012 Task Force Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

4

SEATTLE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

3/15/2012 11:17 AM

[VOL. 87:1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1980, of all states, Washington had the highest rate of
disproportionate minority representation in its prisons.1 Today, minority
racial and ethnic groups remain disproportionately represented in
Washington State’s court, prison, and jail populations, relative to their
share of the state’s general population.2 The fact of racial and ethnic
disproportionality in our criminal justice system is indisputable.
Our research focused on trying to answer why these
disproportionalities exist. We examined differential commission rates,
facially neutral policies with disparate impacts, and bias as possible
contributing causes.
We found that the assertion attributed to then-Justice Sanders of the
Supreme Court of Washington that “African-Americans are
overrepresented in the prison population because they commit a
disproportionate number of crimes,”3 is a gross oversimplification.
Studies of particular Washington State criminal justice practices and
institutions find that race and ethnicity influence criminal justice
outcomes over and above commission rates.4 Moreover, global
assertions about differential crime commission rates are difficult to
substantiate. Most crime victims do not report crimes and most criminal
offenders are never arrested.5 We never truly know exact commission
rates.6 Even if arrest rates are used as a proxy for underlying commission
rates, 2009 data show that 45% of Washington’s imprisonment
disproportionality cannot be accounted for by disproportionality at
arrest.7
We reviewed research that focused on particular areas of
Washington’s criminal justice system and conclude that much of the
1. Scott Christianson, Corrections Law Developments: Racial Discrimination and Prison
Confinement—A Follow-Up, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 616, 617 (1980).
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. Steve Miletich, Two State Supreme Court Justices Stun Some Listeners with Race Comments,
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2013226310_just
ices22m.html.
4. See discussion infra Part III.B.
5. See infra text accompanying note 91.
6. See discussion infra Part III.A.
7. Task Force researchers analyzed 2009 data obtained from the Washington State Association of
Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, and then replicated the commission versus disparity figure, originally
compiled by Crutchfield et al., and found that 55% of the black-white disproportionality in
imprisonment rates is attributable to index crime arrest rates. In other words, 45% of the racial
disproportionality in imprisonment cannot be explained by and is not attributable to racial
differences in arrest rates. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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disproportionality is explained by facially neutral policies that have
racially disparate effects. For the areas, agencies, and time periods that
were studied, the following disparities were found:
 Youth of color in the juvenile justice system face harsher
sentencing outcomes than similarly situated white youth, as
well as disparate treatment by probation officers.8
 Defendants of color were significantly less likely than
similarly situated white defendants to receive sentences that
fell below the standard range.9
 Among felony drug offenders, black defendants were 62%
more likely to be sentenced to prison than similarly situated
white defendants.10
 With regard to legal financial obligations,11 similarly situated
Latino defendants receive significantly greater legal financial
obligations than their white counterparts.12
 Disparate treatment exists in the context of pretrial release
decisions, which systematically disfavors minority
defendants.13
 In Seattle, the black arrest rate for delivery of a drug other
than marijuana is twenty-one times higher than the white
arrest rate for that offense, one of the highest levels of
disparity found across the country.14 Research suggests that
this disparity does not primarily reflect different levels of
involvement with illicit drugs.15
8. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 567 (1998);
see also discussion infra Part III.B.1.
9. ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH. STATE
SUPREME COURT, RACIAL/ETHNIC DISPARITIES AND EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCES IN WASHINGTON
STATE 72 tbl.13B (1993), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/1993SeptRacia%20EthnicDisparitiesReport.pdf; see also
discussion infra Part III.B.2. But see CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., supra, at 72 tbl.13A (showing that
whites were significantly more likely than blacks to receive sentences above the standard range).
10. Sara Steen et al., Images of Danger and Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case Processing,
and Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 435, 451 (2005); see also discussion infra Part III.B.3.
11. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.94A.760 (Supp. 2011) (defining a legal financial obligation and
when it may be imposed).
12. See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
13. See discussion infra Part III.B.5.
14. KATHERINE BECKETT, RACE AND DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SEATTLE 56 tbl.10, 57
(2008), available at
http://faculty.washington.edu/kbeckett/Race%20and%20Drug%20Law%20Enforcement%20in%20
Seattle_2008.pdf.
15. See discussion infra Part III.B.6.
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Minority drivers are more likely to be searched by the
Washington State Patrol than white motorists, although the
rate at which searches result in seizures is highest for
whites.16
In all of these areas, facially neutral policies result in disparate treatment
of minorities over time.
Implicit and explicit racial bias also contributes to this
disproportionality by influencing decision-making within the criminal
justice system.17 Race and racial stereotypes play a role in the judgments
and decision-making of human actors within the criminal justice system.
The influence of such bias is subtle and often undetectable in any given
case, but its effects are significant, cumulative, and observable over
time.18 When policymakers determine policy, when official actors
exercise discretion, and when citizens proffer testimony or jury service,
bias often plays a role.19
To summarize:
 We find the assertion that the overrepresentation of black
people in the Washington State prison system is due solely to
differential crime commission rates inaccurate.
 We find that facially race-neutral policies that have a
disparate impact on people of color contribute significantly to
disparities in the criminal justice system.
 We find that racial and ethnic bias distorts decision-making at
various stages in the criminal justice system, contributing to
disparities.
 We find that race and racial bias matter in ways that are not
fair, that do not advance legitimate public safety objectives,
that produce disparities in the criminal justice system, and
that undermine public confidence in our legal system.
16. See discussion infra Part III.B.8.
17. See, e.g., Robin S. Engel & Richard Johnson, Toward a Better Understanding of Racial and
Ethnic Disparities in Search and Seizure Rates, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 605, 611–12 (2006); Sandra
Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders,
28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 487, 499 (2004); Richard R. Johnson, Race and Police Reliance on
Suspicious Non-Verbal Cues, 30 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 277, 280, 286–
87 (2007); Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race,
Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors: A
Meta-Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315, 1333 (1994); Laura T. Sweeney & Craig
Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Studies, 10
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 179, 192–93 (1992).
18. See Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation
Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 729, 729–30 (2000).
19. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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DEFINITIONS
What We Mean by “Disproportionality” and “Disparity”
Although the terms disproportionality and disparity often are used
interchangeably, there is an important distinction between these two
concepts. We have found it useful to distinguish between racial
inequities that result from differential crime commission rates and racial
inequities that result from practices or policies. In this Report, we use
“disproportionality” to refer to a discrepancy between reference groups’
representation in the general population and in criminal justice
institutions. In contrast, we use “disparity” when similarly situated
groups of individuals are treated differently within those institutions, or
to refer to overrepresentation of particular groups in the criminal justice
system that stems from criminal justice practices or policies.
What We Mean by “Imprisonment” and “Incarceration”
Imprisonment refers to being held in state prisons. Incarceration refers
to being held in state prisons or local jails. Many local jails do not
collect and report on ethnicity, i.e., whether someone is Latino or of
Hispanic origin.
What We Mean by “Rate” and “Ratio”
When discussing incarceration or imprisonment (as well as other
aspects of the criminal justice system), we often discuss the rate of
incarceration or imprisonment in comparison to a particular population.
Thus, the white incarceration rate is measured by taking the number of
whites incarcerated, dividing it by the number of whites in the general
population, and then multiplying by 100,000 to determine the number of
whites incarcerated per 100,000 whites in the general population. To
compare black and white incarceration, we take the black incarceration
rate and divide it by the white incarceration rate—a ratio that provides a
useful measure of comparison.
What We Mean by “Race” and “Ethnicity”
An inherent problem with race is that not many understand what
“race” means. Widely accepted understandings of race focus on biology,
invariably pointing to physical differences among humans that are used
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to define, in genetic terms, different racial groups.20 The distinctions that
we employ today to categorize humans, such as black, white, and Latino,
date back only a few centuries or less.21 These labels do not signal
genetically separate branches of humankind, for there is only one human
race; no other biological race of humanity exists. Racial distinctions are
largely social constructs based upon perception and history.22
Not only are these distinctions socially constructed, but they are also
in constant flux and under perpetual siege by those who dispute the
arbitrary lines that they draw.23 The problem is compounded by the fact
that different institutions use the terms differently. This lack of common
nomenclature makes some comparisons difficult. When a term like
“Asian” may encompass over two billion individuals, its ability to
precisely and accurately describe an individual, much less a group of
individuals, becomes challenging. Similar difficulties imperil the
classifications of “Hispanic” and “Latino,” which are used to describe
not only Dominicans whose descendants may be from Africa,24 but also
Argentines whose ancestry may be traced to Italy,25 and Peruvians
whose forefathers may have emigrated from Japan.26 Additionally, these
traditional categories have come under increasing strain because one in
seven marriages within the United States is now “interracial” or
“interethnic,” rendering single labels less accurate.27
In this Report, we use “race” to refer to groups of people loosely
bound together by history, ancestry, and socially significant elements of
their physical appearance. For instance, when using the term
“Latina/o”—which we will use where possible rather than “Hispanic”—
we mean to describe those individuals whose ancestry is traced back to
Latin America, Spain, and Portugal. This definition contemplates race

20. Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994).
21. Id. at 7–8.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Benjamin Bailey, Dominican-American Ethnic/Racial Identities and United States Social
Categories, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 677, 677–78 (2001) (“The majority of Dominicans have
sub-Saharan African ancestry, which would make them ‘black’ by historical United States ‘onedrop’ rules.” (footnote omitted)).
25. See Samuel L. Baily, Chain Migration of Italians to Argentina: Case Studies of the Agnonesi
and the Sirolesi, STUDI EMIGRAZIONE, Mar. 1982, at 73, 75–76.
26. See J. F. NORMANO & ANTONELLO GERBI, THE JAPANESE IN SOUTH AMERICA 3–4 (1943).
27. Susan Saulny, Counting by Race Can Throw off Some Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/us/10count.html?scp=1&sq=race%20count
ing&st=cse.
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and ethnicity as social phenomena, wherein certain characteristics (i.e.,
history and morphology) are given meanings by society. In this way,
race and ethnicity are not objective observations rooted in biology, but
rather self-reinforcing processes rooted in the daily decisions we make
as individuals and as institutions. Although socially constructed and
enacted, race and ethnicity have important consequences for people’s
lived experiences.
What We Mean by “Structural Racism”
A structurally racist system can be understood best as a system in
which a society’s institutions are embedded with a network of policies
and practices that, overtly or subtly, advantage one racial group over
another, thereby facilitating racially disparate outcomes. Within such
systems, notions and stereotypes about race and ethnicity shape actors’
identities, beliefs, attitudes, and value orientations.28 In turn, individuals
interact and behave in ways that reinforce these stereotypes. Thus, even
with facially race-neutral policies, implementation decisions are
informed by actors’ understandings (or lack thereof) about race and
ethnicity, often leading to disparities in treatment of people of color. As
a consequence, structural racism produces cumulative and persistent
racial and ethnic inequalities.29
Racism should not be viewed as an ideology or an orientation toward
a certain group but instead as a system: “[A]fter a society becomes
racialized, racialization develops a life of its own. Although it interacts
with class and gender structurations in the social system, it becomes an
organizing principle of social relations itself.”30 The persistent inequality
experienced by blacks and other people of color in America is, in part,
the result of this racial structure.31 The contemporary racial structure is
distinct from that of the past in that it is covert, is embedded within the
regular practices of institutions, does not rely on a racial vocabulary, and
is invisible to most whites.32

28. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation, 62 AM. SOC.
REV. 465, 475–76 (1997).
29. Id. at 475.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 467.
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INTRODUCTION

Washington State has a mixed history when it comes to its treatment
of racial and ethnic minorities. It was founded through the displacement
of its native peoples by legal and extralegal means.33 Washington’s early
history included severe anti-immigrant sentiment expressed first toward
Chinese immigrants34 and then Japanese immigrants, who were the
target of the state’s Alien Land Laws.35 Yet unlike other states that
instituted de jure segregation of schools and severely limited
participation in the legal system,36 Washington did not mandate school
segregation by law and was the only western state that did not ban
interracial marriage.37 In fact, Washington became so well known for its
openness that interracial couples would often travel to the state solely to
get married.38 A ready coalition of four distinct racial minorities—
blacks, Chinese, Filipinos, and Japanese—worked together during the
1930s to defeat various policies that targeted racial minorities.39 These
33. See generally 31 HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF WASHINGTON, IDAHO, AND
MONTANA 1845–1889 (S.F., The History Co. 1890).
34. See, e.g., DOUG CHIN, SEATTLE’S INTERNATIONAL DISTRICT: THE MAKING OF A PAN-ASIAN
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22 (2001) (documenting the 1886 attempted forcible removal of 350
Chinese immigrants from Seattle); ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN
THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, at 59–60 (1988) (documenting the forcible removal of Chinese
from Tacoma throughout 1885 and 1886).
35. See Mark L. Lazarus III, An Historical Analysis of Alien Land Law: Washington Territory &
State 1853–1889, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 197, 235–36 (1989).
36. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8003, 8004 (Deering 1944) (repealed 1947) (authorizing the
segregation of children of Chinese, Japanese, or Mongolian parentage, and Indians under certain
circumstances); People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (interpreting a statute that excluded “Blacks” and
“Indians” from testifying against white defendants, and classifying Chinese persons as either
“Indian” or “Black” in order to exclude the testimony of a Chinese witness against the white
defendant).
37. Stefanie Johnson, Blocking Racial Intermarriage Laws in 1935 and 1937: Seattle’s First Civil
Rights
Coalition,
SEATTLE
C.R.
&
LAB.
HIST.
PROJECT
(2005),
http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/antimiscegenation.htm. The Washington Territory, however, did
ban interracial marriage from 1866 to 1868. Act of Jan. 20, 1866, § 2(3), 1865–1866 Wash. Sess.
Laws 80, 81 (“Marriages . . . are prohibited . . . [w]hen either of the parties is a white person and the
other a negro or Indian, or a person of one-half or more negro or Indian blood.”), repealed by Act of
Jan. 23, 1868, § 1, 1867–1868 Wash. Sess. Laws 47, 47-48; Act of Jan. 29, 1855, § 1, 1854–1855
Wash. Sess. Laws 33, 33 (“[A]ll marriages heretofore solemnized in this territory, where one of the
parties to such marriage shall be a white person, and the other possessed of one-fourth or more
negro blood, or more than one-half Indian blood, are hereby declared void.”).
38. RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS
342 (1989).
39. Johnson, supra note 37 (“Four distinct racial minorities—blacks, Filipinos, Japanese, and
Chinese—dominated the Seattle’s [sic] civil rights politics over the 1930s, and each group brought
something different to the political table . . . .”).
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initial campaigns laid the groundwork for future collaboration that
would cut across racial lines.40
Despite this coalition, troubling manifestations of racial
discrimination in the public and private spheres continued,
demonstrating that Washington State was hardly immune to racial bias.
For instance, in March 1942, 14,400 persons of Japanese descent lived in
Washington State, including 9600 in King County alone.41 Of these,
nearly 13,000 were incarcerated and placed into internment camps.42
Over 30% of those forcibly removed from Seattle never returned to their
homes.43 After World War II, Seattle’s black population experienced its
own backlash, as restrictive covenants and other forms of housing
discrimination proliferated throughout Washington State between 1940
and 1960.44 These covenants were so effective in Seattle that they
functionally concentrated 78% of the black community into the area
known as the “Central District.”45 While residential discrimination is no
longer sanctioned by the law, its effects continue to reverberate even
today.46
Even after Japanese American incarceration ended and residential
discrimination became less overt, one area continued to produce
racialized outcomes: the criminal justice system. In 1980, scholar Scott
Christianson published findings showing that Washington State led the
nation in disproportionate imprisonment of blacks.47 While every state
disproportionately imprisoned blacks, the overrepresentation of blacks
relative to the size of the black population was greatest in Washington.48
In a 2005 report discussing Christianson’s finding, Robert Crutchfield
found that while blacks in 1980 constituted approximately 28% of the
prison population, they constituted approximately 3% of the general

40. Id. (“The 1935 and 1937 campaigns laid the groundwork for future multi-ethnic collaboration
on subsequent civil rights and progressive issues.”).
41. DAVID A. TAKAMI, DIVIDED DESTINY: A HISTORY OF JAPANESE AMERICANS IN SEATTLE 46
(1998).
42. Id. at 50.
43. Robert S. Chang & Catherine E. Smith, John Calmore’s America, 86 N.C. L. REV. 739, 748–
49 (2008).
44. QUINTARD TAYLOR, THE FORGING OF A BLACK COMMUNITY: SEATTLE’S CENTRAL DISTRICT
FROM 1870 THROUGH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 178–80 (1994).
45. Id. at 179.
46. Henry W. McGee, Jr., Seattle’s Central District, 1990–2006: Integration or Displacement?,
39 URB. LAW. 167, 214–16 (2007).
47. Christianson, supra note 1.
48. Id. at 616.
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population.49 The black share of the prison population was more than
nine times greater than the black share of the general population.50
Nationally, the black share of the prison population was four times
greater than the black share of the general population.51
Christianson’s findings sparked a firestorm of concern among
policymakers, researchers, and citizens in Washington State.52 The state
legislature responded by commissioning a study to determine whether
racial disparity existed in Washington’s criminal justice system.53 The
1986 Crutchfield and Bridges study was the first in a series of studies
over the last twenty-five years to find that racial bias exists at various
points in Washington’s criminal justice system.54 In particular, this first
study found that race affects the processing of felony cases in
Washington State, even after controlling for legally relevant factors.55
That is, all things being equal, outcomes were worse for defendants who
were black than for defendants who were white.56
In the wake of the 1986 Crutchfield and Bridges report, the state
legislature established the Washington State Minority and Justice Task
Force to study “the treatment of minorities in the state court system, to
recommend reforms and to provide an education program for the
judiciary.”57 Among other findings, the 1990 report concluded that
minorities perceive “that bias pervades the entire legal system in general
and hence [minorities] do not trust the court system to resolve their
disputes or administer justice evenhandedly.”58 In particular, this
49. See Exhibit 2: Declaration and Report of Robert D. Crutchfield, Ph.D. at 244–45, Farrakhan
v. Gregoire, No. 2:96-cv-00076-RHW (E.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2006), ECF No. 233-4, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/exhibitsstatementof
materialfactspart3.pdf.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The Washington State Legislature began to focus on racial disproportionality within the
criminal justice system after Christianson’s 1980 report came out. In response, the legislature
commissioned the original Crutchfield and Bridges study of 1986, which spawned many of the other
studies cited in this Report. Cumulatively, these studies make Washington one of the most, if not the
most studied state when it comes to racial disproportionality in the criminal justice system. See id. at
244.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. GEORGE S. BRIDGES & ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD, INST. FOR PUB. POLICY & MGMT., UNIV.
OF WASH., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN IMPRISONMENT 26 (1986).
56. Id. at 34.
57. CHARLES Z. SMITH, WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE TASK FORCE, WASH. STATE
SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT, at xxi (1990), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/TaskForce.pdf.
58. Id. at 10.
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perception of bias extended to criminal proceedings, where minorities
reported that they received disparate treatment from prosecutors, law
enforcement authorities, and public defenders.59 The report concluded
that more research was needed to determine how race affects individual
experiences with various aspects of Washington’s criminal justice
system, such as pretrial release, bail, prosecutorial discretion, and quality
of counsel.60
Decades later, the perception that racial bias permeates the criminal
justice system persists.61 But now there is substantial evidence to support
the notion that racial inequities do permeate the criminal justice system.
Subsequent studies commissioned since 1986 have confirmed that
Washington cannot justify its disproportionate minority incarceration
rates on the sole basis that minorities commit more crimes.62 For
instance, the extant research concerning the Washington State Patrol
suggests that race does not affect police discretion with regard to stops
but does affect searches.63 Other research indicates that Seattle drug
arrest patterns and outcomes are shaped by race.64 Another study found
that even after controlling for legally relevant factors, racial differences

59. Id. at 25–33.
60. Id. at 21–22.
61. See, e.g., SAM PAILCA, OFFICE OF PROF’L ACCOUNTABILITY, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T,
REPORT ON SEATTLE’S RESPONSE TO CONCERNS ABOUT RACIALLY BIASED POLICING 1 (2003),
available at http://www.seattle.gov/police/opa/Docs/BiasedPolicing.pdf (discussing the widespread
perception that racial bias exists in law enforcement).
62. See Exhibit 2: Declaration and Report of Robert D. Crutchfield, Ph.D., supra note 49, at 237–
40.
63. See, e.g., NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH ET AL., DIV. OF GOV’TL STUDIES & SERVS., WASH. STATE
UNIV., REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE PATROL 23, 42–43 (2007) [hereinafter LOVRICH ET
AL., 2007 STUDY], available at http://www.wsp.wa.gov/publications/reports/wsu_2007_report.pdf
(finding that police stops involving blacks, Native Americans, and Hispanics are more likely to
result in searches); NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH ET AL., DIV. OF GOV’TL STUDIES & SERVS., WASH.
STATE UNIV., ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC STOP DATA COLLECTED BY THE WASHINGTON STATE PATROL
2 (2005), available at http://www.policeforum.org/library/racially-biased-policing/supplementalresources/wsu_2005_report[1].pdf (finding the same); NICHOLAS LOVRICH ET AL., DIV. OF GOV’TL
STUDIES & SERVS., WASH. STATE UNIV., WSP TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS PROJECT REPORT 2–
3 (2003) [hereinafter LOVRICH ET AL., 2003 STUDY], available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.102.7223&rep=rep1&type=pdf (finding
the same).
64. Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug
Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 119, 129 (2006) [hereinafter Beckett et al., Race, Drugs,
and Policing] (concluding that racially disproportionate drug arrest rates in Seattle cannot be
explained by comparing commission rates, but rather are the result of police practices that have a
racially disparate impact); Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the
Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 435–36 (2005) [hereinafter Beckett et
al., Lessons from Seattle] (concluding the same).
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affect how cases are processed: minorities were more likely than whites
to be held in custody prior to trial, less likely than whites to be released
on personal recognizance following arrest, and more likely to receive
monetary bail.65 While these and other studies have focused on different
decision-making points in the criminal justice system, one troubling
conclusion, in particular, underlies each study’s findings: when it comes
to Washington State’s criminal justice system, race matters.
Given this state’s history and the evidence demonstrating the
importance of race in the criminal justice system, members of the
community were understandably concerned when two sitting
Washington State Supreme Court Justices opined on October 7, 2010,
that racial minorities are overrepresented in the prison population solely
because they commit more crimes and not because any bias exists in the
criminal justice system.66 The comments themselves betrayed a common
misunderstanding about whether this issue is more complex than a
cursory review of certain crime conviction rates might imply. Conviction
rates are not a valid proxy for commission rates.
In the wake of these comments, concerned community members came
together to form the Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice
System. We met because the simplistic notion that black
overrepresentation in our prisons occurs because blacks commit more
crimes did not fit with our sense of how racial and ethnic minorities are
treated in today’s society and in our criminal justice system. We realized
quickly, though, that it was important not to proceed on assumptions that
unfair treatment existed.
The Task Force divided into five working groups: Oversight,
Community Engagement, Research, Recommendations/Implementation,
and Education. The Research Working Group’s mandate was to
investigate disproportionalities in the criminal justice system and, where
disproportionalities existed, investigate possible causes. This fact-based
inquiry was designed to serve as a basis for recommending changes that
would promote fairness, reduce disparity, ensure legitimate public safety
objectives, and instill public confidence in our criminal justice system.
As we engaged in this work, the Research Working Group reported back
to the broader Task Force. Our membership grew as more and more
organizations and institutions recognized the importance of this issue,
65. GEORGE S. BRIDGES, WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH. STATE SUPREME
COURT, A STUDY ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN SUPERIOR COURT BAIL AND PRE-TRIAL
DETENTION PRACTICES IN WASHINGTON 52–53 (1997), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/1997_ResearchStudy.pdf.
66. Miletich, supra note 3.
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not just for the affected racial and ethnic groups, but also for the best
aspirations we have as a state. One measure of the goodwill of the
people of the State of Washington is the broad range of organizations
and individuals who have joined the Task Force, for what all of us have
come to realize is a multi-year project.
For this Report, the Research Working Group reviewed evidence on
disproportionality in Washington’s criminal justice system and
considered whether crime commission rates accounted for this
disproportionality. We found that crime commission rates by race and
ethnicity are largely unknown and perhaps unknowable, but that some
researchers simply take arrest rates as good proxies for underlying
commission rates for all crimes.67 We found that use of arrest rates likely
overstates black crime commission rates for several reasons.68 But even
if arrest rates are used as a proxy for underlying crime commission rates,
the extent of racial disproportionality is not explained by commission
rates. In 1982, 80% of black imprisonment in Washington for serious
crimes could not be accounted for based on arrest rates, though by 2009,
this had dropped to 45%.69
We then identified and synthesized research on nine issues for which
evidence exists regarding the causes of Washington’s disproportionality:
(1) juvenile justice; (2) prosecutorial decision-making; (3) sentencing
outcomes; (4) legal financial obligations (“LFOs”); (5) pretrial release;
(6) drug enforcement; (7) asset forfeiture; (8) traffic enforcement; and
(9) prosecution for Driving While License Suspended (“DWLS”). In
each of these areas, the research, data, and findings pertain specifically
to Washington State.70
We also reviewed research regarding bias, especially research on
unconscious or implicit bias. We found that cognitive neuroscience and
social psychology help us to better understand the existence and
behavioral consequences of unconscious or implicit racism.71
67. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionality of United States’ Prison
Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1259, 1264 (1982).
68. For instance, because most black victims identify their assailants as black, and because black
victims have a higher reporting rate generally, crimes involving black suspects are more likely to
receive police attention. See discussion infra Part III.A.
69. Robert D. Crutchfield et al., Analytical and Aggregation Biases in Analyses of Imprisonment:
Reconciling Discrepancies in Studies of Racial Disparity, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 166, 179
(1994); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
70. The informational resources and preliminary findings were made available to the
Recommendations and Implementation Working Group to help inform their policy
recommendations.
71. See, e.g., Phelps et al., supra note 18.
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The evidence we gathered demonstrates that within Washington
State’s criminal justice system, race and ethnicity matter in ways that are
inconsistent with fairness, that do not advance legitimate public safety
objectives, and that undermine public confidence.
Part II presents the Working Group’s findings and data regarding
racial disproportionality within Washington State’s criminal justice
system. Part III discusses three possible causes for this
disproportionality. Part III.A discusses differential commission rates,
concluding that this factor alone cannot account for the
disproportionality observed in the criminal justice system. Part III.B
discusses seven racially neutral policies that have racially disparate
effects, and thus help explain racial disproportionality. Finally, Part III.C
discusses bias, whether explicit or implicit, and how it produces racial
disparity.
II.

RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY WITHIN WASHINGTON
STATE’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

For context, we note that the United States has the highest
incarceration rate of any country in the world, more than twice as great
as the two Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
countries with the next highest rates (Chile and Israel), more than six
times that of Canada, nearly four times that of Mexico, and nearly five
times as great as the United Kingdom.72 Within the United States, the
high incarceration rate is disproportionately experienced by certain racial
and ethnic groups, with whites incarcerated at a rate of 412 per 100,000
white residents, blacks incarcerated at a rate of 2290 per 100,000 black
residents, and Latinos incarcerated at a rate of 742 per 100,000 Latino
residents.73 In the United States, drawing from 2005 data, blacks are
incarcerated at 5.6 times and Latinos at 1.8 times the rate of whites.74

72. World Prison Brief, Entire World—Prison Population Rates per 100,000 of the National
Population,
INT’L
CTR.
FOR
PRISON
STUDIES,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/
worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). An OECD
country is one that participates in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
whose purpose is to coordinate policy among certain developed countries.
73. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES
INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 4 tbl.1 (2007), available at
OF
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf.
74. Id. at 3.
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TABLE 1: PRISON AND JAIL INCARCERATION RATES AND RATIOS,
2005, UNITED STATES75
Incarceration rate
Disproportionality ratio
(per 100,000)
(in comparison to
White)
White
412
n/a
Black
2290
5.6
Latino
742
1.8
In 2005, the black incarceration rate in Washington, 2522 per 100,000
black residents, was greater than the national average.76 The Latino
incarceration rate, reported at 527 per 100,000 Latino residents, was
lower than the national average. We include this figure with caution,
however, because many local jails, including King County’s, do not
collect ethnic demographic information. In 2005, blacks in Washington
were incarcerated at 6.4 times and Latinos at 1.3 times the rate of whites,
with the caveat that the Latino figure likely reflects both an undercount
of Latinos and an overcount of whites.77 The fact of racial and ethnic
disproportionality in Washington’s incarcerated population is
indisputable.
TABLE 2: PRISON AND JAIL INCARCERATION RATES AND RATIOS,
2005, WASHINGTON78
Incarceration rate
Disproportionality ratio
(per 100,000)
(in comparison to
White)
White
393
n/a
Black
2522
6.4
Latino
527
1.3

75. Id. at 4 tbl.1.
76. Id. at 6 tbl.2, 11 tbl.6, 13 tbl.7.
77. Id. at 6 tbl.2. The result is that the Latino-white ratio is likely significantly greater than 1.3 to
1 and the black-white ratio is probably slightly higher than 6.4 to 1. Id.
78. Id. at 6 tbl.2.
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Our review of more recent data reveals that racial and ethnic
disproportionalities exist at many different stages of the criminal justice
system, including arrest, charging, conviction, and imprisonment.79 The
figure below shows 2010 Hispanic-white, black-white, and Native-white
disproportionality ratios at conviction for serious felonies by offense
categories. The figure shows that the disproportionalities are not
consistent for different offense categories.
FIGURE 1: 2010 HISPANIC-WHITE, NATIVE AMERICAN-WHITE, AND
BLACK-WHITE DISPROPORTIONALITY RATIOS AT CONVICTION FOR
SERIOUS FELONIES BY OFFENSE CATEGORIES80

The data provided to us by the Office of Financial Management, the
Washington State Center for Court Research, and the Washington
Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs on arrests, charges,
convictions, and imprisonment show that racial and ethnic
disproportionalities still exist at these different points in Washington’s
criminal justice system. We turn now to examine possible causes of
these disproportionalities.
79. See discussion infra Part III.
80. These ratios are comparisons between the rates per 100,000. For example, Figure 1 illustrates
that blacks and Native Americans are, respectively, over five and two times more likely than whites
to be convicted of a violent offense. The 2010 data are on file with the Gonzaga Law Review.
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III. PROFFERED CAUSES FOR RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY
A.

Crime Commission Rates

The best available evidence suggests that the disproportionalities
discussed in Part II are only partly attributable to racial differences in
crime commission rates. It is important to note that crime commission
rates cannot be known directly and can only be estimated. Generally,
two methods are used to estimate the level of crime commission among
different racial and ethnic groups. Some criminologists use crime
victimization survey data in which victims identify the perceived race of
their assailant to gain insight regarding differential commission rates by
race.81 These data reflect victim perceptions of racial identity of their
assailant and include only nonfatal but violent crimes where there is
direct contact between the victim and the perpetrator (e.g., robbery, rape,
and assault).82 Because information about victim perceptions of
perpetrators’ race is available for only a few violent offenses, crime
victimization survey data present an incomplete picture of crime
commission rates by race.
Other criminologists use arrests as a proxy for crime commission.83
But this likely presents a distorted picture because blacks are
overrepresented in arrests compared to victim identifications. For
example, in the 2005 crime victim survey, victims of nonfatal violent
crimes identified their assailants as black 23.7% of the time.84 By
contrast, 39% of those arrested for nonfatal violent crimes in 2005 were
black.85 Consequently, studies that treat arrests as a measure of crime
commission will likely overstate the rate of crime commission by blacks
and therefore underestimate racial disparity in criminal justice
processing.
A recent comprehensive review of data from numerous studies of the
effect of race on the police decision to arrest similarly concludes that
81. See, e.g., Patrick A. Langan, Racism on Trial: New Evidence to Explain the Racial
Composition of Prisons in the United States, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 666 (1985) (relying on
victim reports to generate a study on the racial composition of prisons).
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 67.
84. Victimization survey data are drawn from BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 215244, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005
STATISTICAL TABLES tbls.40 & 46 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cvus05.pdf.
85. Arrest data are drawn from Crime in the United States 2005, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION tbl.43 (Sept. 2006), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_43.html.
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minority suspects are more likely to be arrested than white suspects.86
This analysis controls for “demeanor, offense severity, presence of
witnesses, quantity of evidence at the scene, the occurrence or discovery
of a new criminal offense during the encounter, the suspect being under
the influence of drugs or alcohol, prior record of suspect, [and] requests
to arrest by victims . . . .”87 Race appears to have an impact apart from
these factors.88
Differences in reporting practices and offending patterns may also
contribute to the overrepresentation of black suspects among arrestees.
As a result of these differences, black suspects are more likely to come
to the attention of the police.89 Specifically, most white victims identify
their assailants as white, and most black victims identify their assailants
as black.90 Over half of violent crimes and over 60% of property crimes
are not reported by victims to the police.91 Higher reporting rates among
black victims mean that crimes involving black suspects are more likely
to come to the attention of the police.92
But even if we use arrest rates as a proxy for crime commission, there
remains a very significant disproportionality at imprisonment that is not
accounted for by arrest rates. A 1994 study by Crutchfield, Bridges, and
Pitchford compared black-white disproportionality in 1982 index crime
arrests and incarceration rates, and found that differential rates of crime
commission (as measured by arrest) explained only 19.3% of the blackwhite disproportionality in Washington State prisons.93 Using 2009 data
obtained from the Washington State Association of Sheriffs and Police
Chiefs, we replicated the Crutchfield et al. analysis and found that 55%
of the black-white disproportionality in imprisonment rates is
attributable to index crime arrest rates.94 In other words, 45% of the
86. Tammy Rinehart Kochel et al., Effect of Suspect Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49
CRIMINOLOGY 473, 475 (2011).
87. Id. at 495–98.
88. Id. at 490.
89. ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ
214258, BLACK VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 5 tbl.5 (2007), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/bvvc.pdf (noting the percentage of violent victimization
from 2001 to 2005, by victim race/Hispanic origin and offender race).
90. Id.
91. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 231327, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2009, at 9 tbl.12 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv09.pdf (noting the percentage of crimes reported to the
police in 2009, by gender, race, and Hispanic origin).
92. Id.
93. Crutchfield et al., supra note 69.
94. Index crimes are defined by the FBI and include homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
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racial disproportionality in imprisonment is not attributable to racial
differences in arrest rates. Thus, it appears that a larger share of
disproportionality in confinement rates stems from arrest patterns than
was the case in 1982.
However, the 55% figure should not be interpreted as evidence that
differences in crime commission rates explain over half of the
overrepresentation of blacks in state prisons for several reasons.95 First,
this interpretation assumes arrests are an accurate measure of crime, but
it is likely that they overrepresent people of color for the reasons stated
above. In particular, arrest data probably overrepresent black suspects.96
In addition, Latinos are not identified as such in the arrest and
incarceration data for which the 55% figure is derived.97 Because most
Latinos in Washington State are identified racially as white in these data,
the white arrest and incarceration rates used in these calculations are
inflated, and the results therefore underestimate the extent to which
blacks are overrepresented at the arrest stage relative to crime
commission rates. Finally, this method assesses disproportionality in
state prisons but does not tell us anything about racial
disproportionalities in jails, community supervision, and misdemeanor
courts. Indeed it is likely that discretion and disproportionality are
greater in these parts of the criminal justice system. Thus, concluding
that 55% of the racial disproportionality in imprisonment rates is
attributable to arrest patterns, and assuming that arrest patterns reflect
crime commission rates, overstates the extent to which
disproportionality in prisons flows from differential crime commission
rates. Whatever the precise figure, it is clear that differential crime
commission rates can explain only a part of the racial
disproportionalities that characterize Washington State courts, jails, and
prisons.
burglary, larceny (over $50), motor vehicle theft, and arson. Uniform Crime Reporting Program
Frequently Asked Questions, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 2 (Apr. 2009),
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/frequently-asked-questions/ucr_faqs08.pdf. The 2009 data are
on file with the Gonzaga Law Review. This analysis involved calculating the black-white arrest and
imprisonment disproportionality ratios, and then the percent of the latter that is a function of the
former.
95. Nor should this figure be interpreted to mean that 45% of disproportionality in confinement
necessarily stems from race differences in criminal justice processing: legally relevant factors such
as offender score may account for some or all of this discrepancy.
96. Arrest data are problematic because a comparison of victimization surveys and arrest data
show that blacks are arrested at a higher rate than they are identified by victims. See discussion
supra notes 89–94; see also Kochel et al., supra note 86.
97. Again, this is because some state and local agencies do not identify Latinos as a separate
racial group.

04 - WLR March 2012 Task Force Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

SEATTLE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

22
B.

3/15/2012 11:17 AM

[VOL. 87:1

Structural Racism: Facially Neutral Policies with Racially
Disparate Effects

The Research Working Group focused its efforts on nine issues
covered by existing research and data, and in each area we found that
racial disproportionalities are caused, in part, by practices and policies
that produce racially disparate outcomes. We are not arguing that
particular individuals, actors, or agencies are intentionally
discriminating. The studies described below do not prove that any one
actor or group of actors is racist. Rather, the research as a whole
suggests that Washington State’s criminal justice system facilitates
racially disparate outcomes in two more subtle ways. First, in some
instances, facially neutral policies have racially disparate outcomes. For
example, judicial consideration of ostensibly race-neutral factors such as
employment status when making pretrial release decisions disadvantages
defendants of color because they are less likely than white defendants to
be employed.98
Second, the research suggests that the race or ethnicity of suspects
and defendants affects how those individuals are perceived, and that this
perception impacts how they are treated within the criminal justice
system. The literature on implicit bias, discussed in Part III.C, shows
that these race effects are likely to be unconscious and unintended rather
than conscious and purposeful. While traditional models of racism
emphasize individual acts of discrimination or racially charged policies,
structural racism describes the interaction between various institutions
and practices that are neutral on their face but nevertheless produce
racialized outcomes.99
Put differently, structures matter and a system’s structure has a
tremendous influence over the results a system produces. Policies can
produce foreseeable, if unintended, harms that run along racial lines.100

98. See Washington State Employment Situation Report for March 2010, WASH. STATE EMP’T
SEC. DEP’T (Apr. 13, 2010) (on file with Washington Law Review) which states:
Historically, the Black or African American population has had the highest unemployment
rates, roughly twice that of both white and Asian populations. For the first quarter of 2010, the
Black or African American population had an unemployment rate of 16.7 percent, the white
and Asian populations, 9.5 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively. The Black or African
American unemployment rate jumped by 3.1 percent between the first quarter of 2009 and the
first quarter of 2010, while white and Asian populations increased only 1.3 percent and 1.6
percent, respectively.
Id.
99. See generally John A. Powell, Structural Racism: Building upon the Insights of John
Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791 (2008).
100. Id. at 794.
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Moreover, bias may be unconscious or conscious. This suggests that we
should not concentrate on individual motives but instead on those
practices and procedures whose cumulative effect is to facilitate
racialized outcomes—that is, outcomes that fall along racial lines. By
identifying and then reforming these structures and processes, we can
begin to address racial disproportionality within Washington’s criminal
justice system.
The Research Working Group’s findings are discussed below
regarding each studied context of disproportionality in Washington
State’s criminal justice system.
1.

Racial Disparity in Juvenile Justice

Youth of color are overrepresented in Washington State’s juvenile
justice system.101 Although policymakers, practitioners, and researchers
have studied this disproportionate minority contact (DMC) for the past
twenty years,102 the problem still persists. For example, in 2007, African
American youth comprised just under 6% of the state’s population aged
ten through seventeen years, but comprised roughly 12% of the state’s
juvenile arrests.103 Youth of color are similarly overrepresented at the
disposition stage (that is, the stage at which a decision or conviction is
rendered). Two years prior, in 2005, African American youth comprised
just under 4% of the state’s population, but received over 13% of the
state’s juvenile dispositions.104 There was a similar pattern of
overrepresentation for Latino youth (11% of the state population, yet
received 14% of the juvenile dispositions)105 and for Native American
youth (2% of the state population yet received nearly 5% of the juvenile
dispositions).106
This disproportionality is even greater for youth committed to the
101. WASH. STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN
JUVENILE SENTENCING, FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 1 & tbl.1 (2005), available at
http://www.cfc.wa.gov/PublicationSentencing/DisparityDisproportionality/Adult_DisparityDisprop
ortionality_FY2005.pdf.
102. See, e.g., Emily R. Cabaniss et al., Reducing Disproportionate Minority Contact in the
Juvenile Justice System: Promising Practices, 12 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 393, 394–400
(2007) (discussing scholarly and congressional efforts that have taken place since 1988).
103. GOVERNOR’S JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOC. &
HEALTH SERVS., TITLE II FORMULA GRANTS PROGRAM APPLICATION: COMPREHENSIVE 3-YEAR
PLAN FOR FFY 2009–2011, at 13 (2009), available at http://juvjustice.njjn.org/media/
resources/public/resource_308.pdf.
104. See WASH. STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 101.
105. See id.
106. Id.
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Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration (JRA).107 The proportion of
African American youth in JRA facilities is five to six times the
proportion of their population in the state;108 Native American youth
reside in JRA facilities at a rate of two times the proportion of their
respective population in Washington State.109
Even worse, it appears that youth of color may receive disparate
sentencing decisions. In 2005, African American and Asian or Pacific
Islander youth were sentenced to the longest average terms in county
detention.110 African American youth also received the longest terms of
dispositions involving electronic home monitoring and work crew.111
Factors other than differential crime commission rates may contribute
to these racialized outcomes. For instance, a study of probation officers’
assessments of youth in Washington State has found that African
American youth receive more negative attribution assessments about the
causes of their offenses than white youth and that these characterizations
lead to more punitive sentence recommendations.112 In particular, the
study shows that probation officers consistently portray black youth
differently than white youth in descriptions about the nature of their
criminal offending.113 Black youths’ crimes are commonly attributed to
internal traits (attitudes and personalities) while white youths’ crimes are
attributed to their social environment (peers and family).114 These
characterizations shape probation officers’ assessments about the threat
of future offending and lead to more severe sanctions and sentencing
recommendations for black youth.115
Policy changes are needed to both assess and address rates of DMC
and to investigate the mechanisms that produce the disproportionate and
disparate outcomes. We recommend increasing the quality and access to
data management systems that can generate case characteristics. These
characteristics are critical to investigating the extent of DMC and the
processes that lead to the overrepresentation.
107. Washington State’s JRA serves the state’s highest-risk youth. See GOVERNOR’S JUVENILE
JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 103, at 4. A county juvenile court may commit a particular
juvenile offender to JRA custody if the individual has committed many lower-level offenses or a
serious crime. See id.
108. WASH. STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 101, at 3 & tbl.2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Bridges & Steen, supra note 8.
113. Id. at 563–64.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 564–66.
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Furthermore, decision-making environments need to be explored for
points of discretion that can lead to youth of color being overselected for
more severe sanctioning decisions (such as policies leading to detention
decisions and practices of case assessments and recommendations).
Organizational climates should recognize the ways in which subtle
biases can enter into decision-making, and decision-makers should
openly discuss how differences in culture can influence processing
decisions.
2.

Prosecutorial Decision-Making

Prosecutors’ charging decisions and sentencing recommendations
have an important impact on criminal justice outcomes. For example, a
1995 study by Crutchfield, Weis, Engen, and Gainey found that
prosecutors are significantly less likely to file charges against white
defendants than they are against defendants of color.116 This difference
persists even after legally relevant factors—offense seriousness, criminal
history, and weapons charges—are taken into account.117 That study also
found that King County prosecutors recommend longer confinement
sentences for black defendants (after legal factors were held constant),
and that prosecutors are 75% less likely to recommend alternative
sentences for black defendants than for similarly situated white
defendants.118
3.

Confinement Sentencing Outcomes

Several studies following the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981119 find
that race shapes confinement sentence outcomes in Washington State—
that is, those sentences that lead to jail time. A 2003 study by Engen,
Gainey, Crutchfield, and Weis found that defendants of color are
moderately less likely than similarly situated white defendants to receive
sentences that fall below the standard range.120 A 2004 study by
Fernandez and Bowman found that Latino defendants sentenced in
116. ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH.
STATE SUPREME COURT, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY
CASES IN KING COUNTY 4 (1995), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/
pdf/November%201995%20Report.pdf.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 39–40.
119. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.010–.930 (2010 & Supp. 2011).
120. Rodney L. Engen et al., Discretion and Disparity Under Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of
Departures and Structured Sentencing Alternatives, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 116–17 (2003); see also
CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 9, at 32, 34, 72 tbl.13B.
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conservative counties with comparatively large Latino populations are
less likely to receive the statutorily established drug-offender sentencing
alternative than other defendants.121 And most recently, a 2005 study by
Steen, Engen, and Gainey found that among felony drug offenders, the
odds that a black defendant will be sentenced to prison are 62% greater
than the odds for similarly situated white defendants.122 These studies
clearly indicate that race and ethnicity matter for confinement sentencing
outcomes.
4.

Variability and Ethnic Disparity in the Assessment of
“Legal Financial Obligations” in Washington State Courts

Whenever a person is convicted in a Washington State superior court,
the court may order the payment of a “legal financial obligation”
(“LFO”), which is essentially a financial penalty that the defendant must
pay as a consequence of the conviction.123 LFOs are now a common
supplement to prison, jail, and probation sentences for people convicted
of crimes in Washington State courts. For example, all felons must be
assessed a $500 Victim Penalty Assessment Fee for each conviction and
a $100 DNA Collection Fee at the time of the first conviction.124
Although fine and fee amounts are specified statutorily, judges have
significant discretion in determining whether to impose many other
authorized fees and fines.125
This judicial discretion has led to a high degree of variability in LFO
assessment. Significant variation exists even among similar cases and
similarly situated offenders.126 For example, one first-time white
defendant convicted of delivery of methamphetamine in the first two
months of 2004 was assessed $610 in fees and fines; in a different
county, another first-time white defendant convicted of the same crime
during the same time period was assessed $6710 in fees and fines.127
121. Kenneth E. Fernandez & Timothy Bowman, Race, Political Institutions, and Criminal
Justice: An Examination of the Sentencing of Latino Offenders, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41,
63, 66–68 (2004).
122. Steen et al., supra note 10.
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (Supp. 2011).
124. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.68.035, 43.43.690 (2010 & Supp. 2011).
125. KATHERINE A. BECKETT ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH.
STATE SUPREME COURT, THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE 9–10 (2008), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/
committee/pdf/2008LFO_report.pdf.
126. Id. at 24 tbl.4 (depicting wide variations in Washington State superior court LFO
assessments).
127. Id.
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This variability also fosters racialized outcomes. A recent study of
Washington State LFOs found that a number of extra-legal factors
influence the assessment of fees and fines, even after controlling for
offender and Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) offense score.128 In
particular, the statistical analysis shows that Latino defendants receive
significantly greater fees and fines than similarly situated non-Latino
defendants.129
The debt that accrues from the assessment of fees and fines is
substantial relative to ex-offenders’ expected earnings.130 For instance,
defendants sentenced in the first two months of 2004 had been assessed
an average of $11,471 by the courts over their lifetime.131 Because
Washington State currently charges 12% interest on unpaid LFOs, these
financial obligations often persist and expand over the course of many
years.132 By 2008, the individuals sentenced in early 2004 still owed an
average of $10,840 in court debt.133 Ex-offenders who consistently pay
$50 a month will still possess legal debt after thirty years of regular
monthly payments.134 Legal debt—and poor credit ratings—constrains
opportunities and limits access to housing, education, and economic
markets.135 Nonpayment of legal debt may also trigger arrest and
reincarceration.136 We believe that the fairness and wisdom of the laws
authorizing the discretionary assessment of legal financial obligations
need to be reevaluated.
5.

Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Release Decisions in
Washington State Courts

Whether an individual is released pending trial has a significant
influence on the outcome of a case, and it can have cascading effects on
a defendant’s family, ability to maintain a job, and ability to pay for
128. Id. at 23–25.
129. Id. at 24–25; see also Alexes Harris et al., Courtesy Stigma and Monetary Sanctions:
Toward a Socio-Cultural Theory of Punishment, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 234, 248–52 (2011).
130. Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the
Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1756 (2010).
131. Id. at 1773–75.
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (Supp. 2011).
133. Harris et al., supra note 130, at 1775.
134. Id. at 1776–77.
135. Id. at 1777–82.
136. Id. at 1782–85; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF
AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 5, 6 (2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/
assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf#page=8.
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representation.137 The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 78% of
defendants held on bail while awaiting trial were convicted, compared to
60% of defendants who were released pending trial.138 In addition,
defendants held on bail receive more severe sentences than defendants
not detained prior to trial.139 Studies suggest that this correlation is not
solely a function of case characteristics.140 Rather, detention itself has a
small but statistically significant effect on nonfelony case outcomes and
a significant impact on felony case outcomes.141
Although Washington State court rules specify factors courts must
consider when determining whether to release a defendant, judges retain
significant discretion.142 Research demonstrates that extra-legal factors,
including race and ethnicity, significantly impact pretrial release
decisions.143 In particular, the evidence shows that blacks and Latinos
are detained before trial at higher rates than white defendants.144 For
instance, a 1997 University of Washington study found that “minority
defendants and men were less likely to be released on their own
recognizance than others even after adjusting for differences among
defendants in the severity of their crimes, prior criminal records, ties to
the community and the prosecuting attorney’s recommendation.”145
Thus, defendants of color are held on bail at higher rates than other
defendants. Given how much pretrial detention affects case outcomes,
this finding is troubling.
Judges’ consideration of seemingly race-neutral factors may explain
the disparate pretrial detention of defendants of color. In particular,
when determining whether to release a defendant or to impose bail,
judges often consider the defendant’s employment status, the length and
137. See generally JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND
DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1979).
138. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 214994, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 7
& tbl.5 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf.
139. Id.
140. MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., PRETRIAL DETENTION AND
CASE
OUTCOMES,
PART
1:
NONFELONY
CASES
6
(2007),
available
at
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/detention.pdf; MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AGENCY, INC., PRETRIAL DETENTION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART 2: FELONY CASES 58 (2008)
[hereinafter PHILLIPS, FELONY
CASE OUTCOMES],
available
at
http://www.cja
reports.org/reports/felonydetention.pdf.
141. PHILLIPS, FELONY CASE OUTCOMES, supra note 140.
142. BRIDGES, supra note 65, at 1–2.
143. Id. at 7.
144. Id. at 52–53.
145. Id. at 7.
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character of the defendant’s residence in the community, and the
defendant’s family ties and relationships.146 Though presumably not
designed to disadvantage people of color, consideration of these factors
often has that consequence.147 African Americans, Native Americans,
and Latinos are more likely to be economically disadvantaged, have
unstable employment, experience more family disruptions, and have
more residential mobility.148 Judicial focus on such factors means that
people from these ethnic groups are less likely to be released on their
own recognizance than whites.149 We suggest that courts should consider
factors that are not only race-neutral on their face but also race-neutral in
practice when making pretrial detention decisions.
6.

Racial Disparity in Drug Law Enforcement

Seattle has one of the highest rates of racial disparity in drug arrests in
the United States.150 Although only 8% of Seattle’s population is black,
67% of those who are arrested for delivery of a serious drug (narcotics
other than marijuana) in Seattle are black.151 However, a rigorous, datadriven 2008 analysis of drug use, delivery, and law enforcement patterns
in Seattle indicates that this racial disparity in arrest rates does not reflect
the reality of the local drug economy.152 Nor is it a function of public
health, public safety, or civilian complaints.153
According to Seattle Police Department (SPD) arrest figures, the total
black drug arrest rate was more than thirteen times higher than the white
drug arrest rate in 2006.154 Blacks were more than twenty-one times
more likely to be arrested for selling serious drugs than whites in 2005 to
2006, despite the fact that multiple sources suggest that whites are the
majority of sellers and users of serious drugs in Seattle.155 This rate of
146. Id. at 12.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 53.
150. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 56 tbl.10; Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note
64, at 115 & tbl.1.
151. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 56 tbl.10.
152. Id. at 1; see also Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 64, at 119; Beckett et
al., Lessons from Seattle, supra note 64, at 419, 426–29.
153. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 3; see also Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note
64, at 129; Beckett et al., Lessons from Seattle, supra note 64, at 430–35.
154. BECKETT, supra note 14.
155. See id. (using multiple data sources, such as questionnaires and surveys, police reports, and
live observations).
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disparity is surpassed by only one of the other thirty-eight comparably
sized cities in the nation for which data are available.156
The research shows that the primary cause of racial disparity in
Seattle’s drug law enforcement is SPD’s focus on crack cocaine—to the
virtual exclusion of other serious drugs such as heroin, powder cocaine,
ecstasy, and methamphetamine.157 In 2005 to 2006, nearly three-quarters
(74.1%) of all planned arrests for delivery of a serious drug involved
crack cocaine, a pattern that has remained consistent over time.158 Of
those individuals arrested for crack-cocaine delivery, 73.4% were
black.159 By contrast, less than 20% of those arrested for delivering any
other serious drug were black.160
The overrepresentation of crack-cocaine offenders among drug
arrestees does not appear to be a function of public health and safety
concerns, nor of resident complaints.161 Powder cocaine and ecstasy—
not crack cocaine—are the most widely used serious drugs in Seattle.162
Although crack-cocaine use poses health risks, it is less likely than other
serious drugs, such as heroin and other opiates, to be associated with
infectious disease and drug-related mortality.163 Moreover, those arrested
for crack-cocaine offenses are the least likely among serious drug users
to possess a dangerous weapon at the time of arrest.164 Lastly, there is
little geographic correlation between the areas identified by civilian
complainants and the places where planned drug-delivery arrests
occur.165
We believe that a less harmful approach to drug law enforcement is
necessary. Community-based diversion programs provide a viable
alternative to traditional drug law enforcement methods.166 A more
equitable enforcement of drug laws would immediately begin to address
racial disproportionality, especially when illicit drug use is roughly equal
156. Id.
157. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 48.
158. Id. (based on a four-month sampling period of May and June in 2005 and 2006); see also
Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 64, at 123–24.
159. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 2.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 3; see also Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 64, at 129; Beckett et
al., Lessons from Seattle, supra note 64, at 430–35.
162. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 20–21.
163. Id. at 433–34.
164. Id. at 433; see also BECKETT, supra note 14, at 96.
165. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 88–91.
166. MELISSA BULL, JUST TREATMENT: A REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR THE
DIVERSION OF DRUG RELATED OFFENDERS FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23–26 (2003).
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for each racial or ethnic group.
7.

Drug-Related Asset Forfeiture Distorts Law Enforcement
Priorities in Washington State

Drug-related asset forfeiture is an important tool for law enforcement.
Forfeiture laws reduce the incentive for financially motivated crimes
such as drug trafficking by removing the assets that help make such
activities profitable.167 Washington State allows local law enforcement
agencies to retain 90% of the net proceeds from drug-related assets
seized, but the state requires that these funds be used “exclusively for the
expansion and improvement of controlled substances related law
enforcement activity.”168
This allocation creates a conflict between a law enforcement agency’s
economic self-interest and traditional law enforcement objectives.169 In
particular, section 69.50.505 of the Revised Code of Washington creates
a perverse dependence whereby law enforcement agencies rely on assets
seized during drug investigations to fund their operations.170 This
dependence inevitably skews how law enforcement agencies allocate
their resources, and it affects operational decisions regarding whether to
target particular crimes and how to exercise discretion when making
arrests.171 Legitimate goals of crime prevention are compromised when
167. The Washington State Legislature made several findings in 1989 when it was considering
the asset forfeiture law, including the following:
[D]rug-related offenses are difficult to eradicate because of the profits derived from the
criminal activities, which can be invested in legitimate assets and later used for further criminal
activities; and the forfeiture of real assets where a substantial nexus exists between the
commercial production or sale of the substances and the real property will provide a significant
deterrent to crime by removing the profit incentive of drug trafficking, and will provide a
revenue source that will partially defray the large costs incurred by government as a result of
these crimes.
Omnibus Alcohol and Controlled Substances Act, ch. 271, § 211, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 1266,
1298–99 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 note (2010)); see also United States v. Two
Tracts of Real Prop., 998 F.2d 204, 213 (4th Cir. 1993) (“One of the most potent weapons in the
government’s war on drugs is its ability to obtain the civil forfeiture of property that aids violations
of the drug laws.”).
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(10). The remaining 10% of the net proceeds are deposited
into the state general fund. See id. § 69.50.505(9).
169. Eric D. Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, The Next Stage of Forfeiture Reform, 14 FED. SENT’G
REP. 76, 76 (2001).
170. Cf. MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 12 (2010), available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_
folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf (noting that in a nationwide survey, hundreds of law
enforcement executives admitted that “civil forfeiture proceeds were a necessary budget
supplement”).
171. Id. at 12–13 (“One consequence of giving law enforcement a pecuniary interest in forfeiture
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salaries, equipment, and departmental budgets depend on how many
assets are seized during drug investigations.172
Additionally, the standard of proof in Washington State for the
government to successfully claim property through asset forfeiture is one
of the lowest in the country, and it is highly deferential to law
enforcement.173 Section 69.50.505 requires only that a law enforcement
officer have “probable cause” to believe the property is linked to
criminal activity in order to lawfully seize it.174 Making matters worse,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish probable cause to seize
a person’s property.175 If a property owner challenges the seizure, the
burden is only slightly increased to a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard.176 The low evidentiary threshold is troubling because many
property owners whose assets are seized are never charged with a crime
or are not convicted. Investigators at the Seattle Post-Intelligencer found
that 20% of people whose property is seized are never charged with a
crime, and that 40% of the time there is no conviction.177 In fact, even in
those cases where charges are filed, the case is dropped 23% of the
time.178
proceeds is that it can cause them to over-enforce crimes that carry the possibility of forfeiture to the
neglect of other law enforcement objectives. This makes basic economic sense; as the return to
enforcing certain crimes increases, one would expect law enforcement agencies to devote a higher
percentage of their resources to those aims.”); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit:
The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 40 (1998) (“First, these [asset
forfeiture] programs have distorted governmental policymaking and law enforcement. During the
past decade, law enforcement agencies increasingly have turned to asset seizures and drug
enforcement grants to compensate for budgetary shortfalls, at the expense of other criminal justice
goals. We believe the strange shape of the criminal justice system today . . . is largely the unplanned
by-product of this economic incentive structure.”).
172. Eric D. Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, Contesting Government’s Financial Interest in Drug
Cases, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1999, at 4, 5.
173. The highest standard is proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” followed by proof upon “clear
and convincing evidence.” The lowest standard is “probable cause,” which is used in fourteen states,
including Washington. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 170, at 22.
174. Valerio v. Lacey Police Dep’t, 39 P.3d 332, 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (Division II
concluding that property may be seized if law enforcement has probable cause to suspect that the
property in question was used in connection with illegal narcotics activity); Escamilla v. Tri-City
Metro Drug Task Force, 999 P.2d 625, 630 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (Division III concluding the
same); Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 784 P.2d 537, 540-41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (Division I
concluding that initial seizure of property under Washington’s asset forfeiture law requires a
showing of probable cause that the property was used for illegal narcotics activity), rev’d on other
grounds, 804 P.2d 24 (Wash. 1991).
175. Adams County v. One 1978 Blue Ford Bronco, 875 P.2d 690, 692 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
176. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (2010).
177. Sam Skolnik, Critics Target Drug Raid Seizures, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 13,
2001, at A1, available at http://o.seattlepi.com/frontpage/seattle_pima1x220011213.pdf.
178. Id.
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The evidence suggests that the combination of tremendous financial
incentives and limited property rights distorts drug-related priorities and
pressures police to make operational decisions to maximize perceived
financial rewards.179 Especially today, with budgets already stretched
thin, Washington’s police departments are increasingly dependent on
prosecuting the drug war to ensure their economic survival.
Washington’s drug-related asset forfeiture laws reinforce drug-related
law enforcement tactics that have a disparate impact on racial
minorities.180 As discussed above, two-thirds of those arrested for
delivery of a serious narcotics offense in Seattle are black.181 Because a
drug arrest automatically renders much of a defendant’s property
seizable, section 69.50.505 of the Revised Code of Washington has a
disparate impact on defendants of color.
Furthermore, despite the substantial property interests involved,
indigent defendants do not have a right to appointed counsel when
challenging an asset seizure.182 Because indigent defendants tend to be
people of color, minority property owners are at a distinct disadvantage
and bear greater risk that their assets will be liquidated.
We believe that Washington State’s drug-related asset forfeiture laws
can be greatly improved with three simple reforms. First, we urge
Washington State to end the direct profit incentive that allocates 90% of
the net proceeds from asset forfeitures to law enforcement agencies.183
So far, eight states have enacted reforms to end the direct profit
incentive in their drug-related asset forfeiture laws by placing forfeiture
revenue into a neutral account, such as education, drug treatment, or
ideally, in the general treasury of the city, county, or state government
that oversees the seizing agency.184 This single measure could cure the
179. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 170, at 13 (“[T]his is not simply theory. Earlier research
found that in states where agencies get to keep the lion’s share of forfeiture proceeds, drug arrests—
which often have the potential of a related civil forfeiture—constitute a significantly higher
percentage of all arrests.”); Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 78–79 (discussing how police
have an incentive to target buyers in reverse stings because it allows officers to seize the buyer’s
cash).
180. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 171, at 39–40 (noting that traditional drug-enforcement
strategy has “a self-perpetuating life of its own” because of the “lucrative rewards available to
police and prosecutorial agencies that make drug law enforcement their highest priority”).
181. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 1.
182. See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 (2010). The statute provides only that a property owner
may be entitled to attorneys’ fees if the owner “substantially prevails” in a proceeding to reclaim his
or her property. Id. § 69.50.505(6).
183. Id. § 69.50.505(10).
184. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 170, at 17. Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, and Vermont do not distribute any of the proceeds to law
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forfeiture law of its most corrupting effects.185
Second, we recommend increasing the burden of proof required to
seize property. Requiring seizing agencies to demonstrate with “clear
and convincing” evidence that the assets seized were linked to criminal
activity would help protect property owners from arbitrary seizures.
Finally, because of the important property interests at stake, we
suggest that indigent persons be provided with counsel when their assets
are seized. Providing counsel for indigent defendants would help protect
property interests that are often key to indigent persons’ livelihood.
As long as police agencies can expect a financial reward for asset
seizures, they will remain dependent on current tactics that have a
disparate impact on racial minorities.
8.

Racial Disparity in Traffic Enforcement

Since 2000, the Washington State Patrol (WSP) has collected data on
its traffic stops.186 WSP requires its troopers to maintain data for every
contact they have with a motorist, including whether the motorist is
stopped, searched, and cited, as well as the driver’s race and ethnicity.187
Studies based on this data have found no evidence of racial profiling or
any observable racial disparity in traffic stops.188 Although black, Native
American, and Hispanic drivers are stopped at higher rates than white
motorists, this appears to reflect differences in traffic violation rates.189
There is some racial disparity, however, in the outcomes associated with
these stops.
Citations are one such outcome. To assess whether higher citation
rates among drivers of color are attributable solely to differences in
enforcement. Id.; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169 (discussing reform efforts around
the country where voters have approved laws to end the “corrupting incentives” of asset-forfeiture
allocation (quoting United States v. Funds Held in the Name or for the Benefit of Wetterer, 210
F.3d 96, 110 (2d Cir. 2000))).
185. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 170, at 14; Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 80–
81.
186. LOVRICH ET AL., 2003 STUDY, supra note 63, at 22. We note that stops by local law
enforcement constitute the large majority of traffic stops that take place in the state. But very little
empirical data have been collected on the stop, citation, and search practices of these local law
enforcement agencies.
187. See Clayton Mosher et al., The Importance of Context in Understanding Biased Policing:
State Patrol Traffic Citations in Washington State, 9 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 43, 45–46, 47–48 tbls.1
& 2 (2008).
188. Id. at 43–44.
189. Many of the most frequent violations—such as driving with a suspended license or broken
tail light—occur when people cannot afford to pay traffic fines or repair their cars. Thus, higher
violation rates among drivers of color may reflect socioeconomic factors. See id. at 45–46, 48.
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traffic law violation rates, researchers compared the number of alleged
violations in WSP stops that did and did not result in citation.190 The
results indicate that black, Native American, and Latino motorists were
identified by WSP officers as having more traffic violations even in
stops in which officers did not issue a citation.191 This suggests that WSP
officers were not “piling violations on” minority drivers to justify
issuing citations to them. Nonetheless, comparison of citation rates for
drivers with just one violation reveals some racial differences.192
Specifically, black, Native American, Latino, and Asian drivers with one
traffic violation were significantly more likely to be cited than white
motorists with one traffic violation in a total of thirty-six jurisdictions,
but less likely to be cited than comparable white drivers in just six
jurisdictions.193
Additionally, researchers found that “race is clearly an important
factor influencing the likelihood of a search.”194 In particular, the data
show that black, Native American, and Latino motorists are significantly
more likely to be searched once stopped than are white drivers.195 This
disparity exists in both low- and high-discretion searches, and it persists
after time of day and number of violations are taken into account.196
190. Id. at 46, 48–49.
191. Id. at 53–54 tbl5.
192. Id. at 51, 52 tbl.4.
193. The authors concluded that this difference “d[id] not indicate the operation of systemic bias
in citing minorities who have only a single violation recorded by the WSP.” Id. at 51. It is not clear
how the authors made this determination. Forthcoming research examines and critiques the
methodologies that LOVRICH ET AL., supra note 63, employed in their 2007 report on the WSP. See
Mario L. Barnes & Robert S. Chang, Analyzing Stops, Citations, and Searches in Washington and
Beyond, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Clayton Mosher & J. Mitchell Pickerill,
Methodological Issues in Biased Policing Research with Applications to the Washington State
Patrol, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
194. J. Mitchell Pickerill et al., Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A
Disparate Impact Framework, 31 LAW & POL’Y 1, 15 (2009). We note that an overlapping group of
researchers, using data from WSP traffic stops between 2005 and 2007, employed a different
methodology to analyze the disproportionate search rates to conclude that the differences were not
indicative of discrimination. See LOVRICH ET AL., 2007 STUDY, supra note 63, at 49–50. They state
that because the relative disproportionality between groups is the same difference in magnitude for
low- and high-discretion searches, that this reflects a lack of bias in searches by WSP. Id. (“We
come to this conclusion by comparing the likelihoods of high discretion searches to low discretion
searches, which suggest that officers do not act differently based on race when they have higher
levels of discretion.”). But their analysis and conclusions are subject to important methodological
criticism. See Barnes & Chang, supra note 193; Mosher & Pickerill, supra note 193.
195. Pickerill et al., supra note 194. Other driver characteristics also influence the likelihood of a
search. See id. For example, females and older drivers are less likely to be searched than males and
younger drivers. See id.
196. See Pickerill et al., supra note 194, at 15, 19, 21.
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However, the “hit rate”—that is, the share of searches that result in
seizures—is somewhat higher for whites.197 For example, highdiscretion searches of whites led to seizures 24.1% of the time.198 But
the hit rates for minority groups during high-discretion searches were all
lower: 17.6% for Latinos, 22.1% for blacks, 18.1% for Native
Americans, and 22.4% for Asians.199 These findings suggest that
minorities are subject to a higher rate of searches as compared to white
drivers, but that this higher rate is not warranted by any policing purpose
because whites are more likely to have items subject to seizure.
In short, WSP should be recognized as one of a few agencies studied
nationwide that does not exhibit a pattern of disproportionate minority
contact at the “stop level.”200 The data and evidence demonstrate,
however, that WSP officers are more likely to cite black, Native
American, and Latino drivers with one violation than white drivers with
one violation.201 The evidence also shows that race is an important factor
influencing the likelihood of a search.202
9.

Racial Disparity in Driving While License Suspended (DWLS)
Cases

In many misdemeanor courts, Driving While License Suspended in
the Third Degree (DWLS 3) cases constitute at least one-third of the
caseload, and consume a dramatic percentage of misdemeanor court,
prosecution, and public defense resources in a time of severe budget
challenges.203 Currently, there are an estimated 100,000 DWLS 3 cases
in Washington per year,204 many of which result from failure to pay a
traffic ticket or to appear in court for the ticket.205
The costs of prosecuting DWLS 3 cases are staggering. It is estimated
that Washington’s statewide average cost of arrest is $334, cost of

197. Id. at 13 & tbl.3.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Mosher et al., supra note 187, at 53, 56.
201. Pickerill et al., supra note 194, at 51.
202. Id. at 13. We disagree with the authors’ interpretations and conclusions.
203. John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 4 SEATTLE J.
FOR SOC. JUST. 439, 443, 460–61 (2005).
204. JOANNE I. MOORE & DAVID K. CHAPMAN, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., DRIVING
WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED 3RD DEGREE: SURVEY OF COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION 1 (2008),
available at http://www.opd.wa.gov/TrialDefense/090602_DWLS3Survey.pdf.
205. Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 203, at 443.
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conviction is $757, and cost per jail day is $60.71.206 Even though most
first-time DWLS 3 convictions do not result in jail time, many people
are jailed on the second or third offense or for failing to complete
probationary requirements.207 The single largest factor responsible for
driving up the costs of the criminal justice system has been the increased
incarceration rate since 1980.208 Even if the DWLS 3 cases proceed on
the basis of tickets and not arrests, and there is no actual jail time
imposed, the costs of prosecuting and defending those cases approaches
$75 million annually.209 Worse still, this cost does not take into account
the impact on individual defendants and their family.
Additionally, the evidence shows that this facially neutral policy—
treating driving while license suspended as a misdemeanor offense—has
racially disparate effects. Most people charged with DWLS 3 are poor.
A 1999 Seattle study found that of 184 people with suspended licenses,
the average person had $2095 in unpaid fines and a monthly income of
$810.210 Because of economic status and police deployment decisions—
and possibly because of racial profiling in some situations—people of
color are more likely to have suspended licenses for failure to pay a
ticket. For instance, in 2000, a Seattle Times investigation found that
black drivers in Seattle receive more tickets and are more likely to be
cited for defective headlights than are white drivers.211 In some
misdemeanor courts, there is no counsel available for indigent persons at
206. STEVE AOS ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY
OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME
RATES 41 exhibit B.2 (2006), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-10-1201.pdf.
Figures were adjusted for 2007 dollars utilizing the Implicit Price Deflator (GDP) rate; these
computations were performed using the calculator at Samuel H. Williamson, Seven Ways to
Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount—1774 to Present, MEASURINGWORTH (Mar.
2011), http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare.
207. See Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 203, at 440–42.
208. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON
STATE: INCARCERATION RATES, TAXPAYER COSTS, CRIME RATES, AND PRISON ECONOMICS 4 &
fig.5 (2003), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/SentReport2002.pdf.
209. This figure is based on the average cost of a DWLS 3 conviction ($757) and the estimated
number of DWLS 3 cases per year (100,000). See AOS ET AL., supra note 206; MOORE &
CHAPMAN, supra note 204.
210. MUN. COURT OF SEATTLE, PARTNERS IN SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY 1999–2000, at 7
(2001), available at https://www.seattle.gov/courts/pdf/smcreport.pdf.
211. Andrew Garber, Seattle Blacks Twice as Likely to Get Tickets, SEATTLE TIMES (June 14,
2000), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20000614&slug=4026674 (“A
Seattle Times analysis of more than 324,000 citations issued in the past five years also found blacks
get more tickets per stop than whites and are more likely to be cited for certain offenses, such as
defective headlights. For example, the number of tickets issued to blacks for blocking traffic is four
times the proportion of blacks in the driving population.”).
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first appearance or arraignment hearings, and in other courts, public
defense attorneys are too overwhelmed with cases to provide meaningful
assistance. As a result, people of color are more likely to be charged
with DWLS 3.
In response to this worsening problem, court-initiated relicensing
programs have arisen. These programs allow individuals to have their
license reinstated in exchange for continued payment on outstanding
fines.212 King County District Court, for example, schedules at least two
days per month in which an individual may enroll in the program.213
Participants have the option to perform community service at the rate of
$10 for each hour worked.214 The district court holds are released once
the court receives written proof of community service hours
performed.215
In addition, the program offers participation in work crews and credit
toward King County District Court fines at the rate of $150 for every
eight-hour day worked.216 Yet another option is to make a 10% down
payment on fines and monthly payments for the remaining balance.217 A
community-based organization, Legacy of Equality, Leadership and
Organizing, assists individuals with the process and refers them to the
relicensing program.218 These programs both entice the payment of
outstanding fines and reduce the costs of prosecution, public defense,
and jail associated with DWLS 3 defendants.219 The King County
District Court relicensing program is estimated to save two dollars for
every dollar spent.220 King County is not alone in its efforts to address
this crisis. Recently, the City of Spokane Prosecutor’s Office established
212. Cooper Offenbecher, DWS: A Ticket to Debtor’s Prison?, KING COUNTY B. BULL. (Apr.
2008), http://www.kcba.org/newsevents/barbulletin/archive/2008/08-04/article1.aspx (on file with
Washington Law Review); see also Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 203, at 463.
213. Offenbecher, supra note 212; Relicensing Program, KING CNTY.,
http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/DistrictCourt/CitationsOrTickets/RelicensingProgram.aspx (last
updated Jan. 20, 2012).
214. Relicensing Program, supra note 213.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. LELO—LEGACY OF EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZING, http://www.lelo.org (last
visited Dec. 31, 2011). The organization also conducts its own DWLS education programs. See id.
219. Offenbecher, supra note 212.
220. Id.; Corinna Harn, Chief Presiding Judge, King Cnty. Dist. Court, & Tricia Crozier, Chief
Admin. Officer, King Cnty. Dist. Court, Costs & Benefits of the King County District Court
Relicensing Program, Presentation of Findings from a Study by Christopher Murray & Associates
(May
12,
2004)
(PowerPoint
slides
available
at
DEFENDER
ASS’N,
old.defender.org/files/archive/Relicensing_Presentation.ppt (last visited Dec. 31, 2011)).
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a diversion program for DWLS 3 cases that it believes will reduce the
municipal court criminal caseload by 35%.221
Because most people charged with DWLS 3 have their licenses
suspended for not paying a fine or for missing a court hearing, we
believe that if these individuals had the means and the knowledge to
navigate the court system, they could have their licenses reinstated.
Local prosecutors and courts should work with defenders and
community groups to establish precharging diversion and relicensing
programs where they do not now exist. Additionally, the legislature
should amend section 46.20.289 of the Washington Revised Code so
that drivers’ licenses are not suspended for failure to pay a ticket or
attend a court hearing.222
10. Summary
In conclusion, the evidence shows a wide variety of policies and
practices that facilitate racial disparity in Washington’s criminal justice
system. In the nine aforementioned areas—juvenile justice, prosecutorial
discretion, confinement sentencing outcomes, LFOs, pretrial release,
drug law enforcement, asset forfeiture, traffic enforcement, and
DWLS—research has revealed that race matters at various stages in the
disposition of criminal cases. Similarly situated persons are treated
differently along racial lines in the studied contexts. These findings raise
serious concerns regarding other criminal justice contexts yet to be
examined, and they demonstrate how structural racism can and does
affect outcomes in Washington’s criminal justice system.
C.

Bias

Many of us harbor explicit and implicit racial biases, regardless of our
professed commitments to racial equality. If we have these biases, how
many of us will admit them to ourselves, let alone to others? Even then,
how do we know if these feelings in fact affect our behavior? Finally, if
we admit that these feelings can affect our behaviors, are there ways to
prevent racialized outcomes that are inconsistent with our shared
commitment to equality? This section explores evidence regarding bias,
221. Robert C. Boruchowitz, AM. CONSTITUTIONAL SOC’Y, DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING
MISDEMEANORS COULD SAVE $1 BILLION PER YEAR: REDUCING THE NEED FOR AND COST OF
APPOINTED COUNSEL 9 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Boruchowitz%20%20Misdemeanors.pdf.
222. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.289 (2008), invalidated on other grounds by In re Nichols, 211
P.3d 462 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 256 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2011).
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the relationship between bias and behavior, and the potential for
solutions to prevent racially disparate outcomes.
1.

Explicit Bias as Reflected in Survey Data

One of the best sources of survey data on racial attitudes comes from
the General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research
Center at the University of Chicago, which has collected data from faceto-face surveys since 1942.223 The survey has revealed, over time, that
white attitudes toward blacks, as measured by expressed principles, have
shifted dramatically. For example, in 1964, 60% of white respondents
were in favor of laws against intermarriage between blacks and
whites.224 By 2002, the number had dropped to 10% in favor of such
laws, though 35% still opposed intermarriage between whites and
blacks.225 Similar trend data show that when white respondents were
asked in 1977 about black inequality and its causes, 27% reported that it
was due to blacks having less ability.226 By 2006, this number had
dropped to 7% and, by 2010, it had settled at 9%.227 Interestingly, in
1977, 66% of white respondents asked about black inequality stated that
blacks lack motivation.228 In 2008, 52% of white respondents said that
blacks had no motivation and 60% agreed somewhat or strongly that
blacks should try harder.229 Some negative views, such as the attribution
of no motivation, seem to persist at a very high rate. It is also worth
noting that a large percentage of white respondents believe that blacks
are treated unfairly by police, with 36% holding this view in both 1997
and 2007.230
The survey data show a significant diminishment in white negative
223. HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 59 (rev. ed. 1997).
224. Id. at 106 tbl.3.1B.
225. Compare id., with 2011 Update to Table 3.1B of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and
Interpretations, INST. OF GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS (Oct. 2011),
http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Trends%20in%20Racial%20Attitudes_3-1B.pdf.
226. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 223, at 156–57 tbl.3.4A.
227. 2011 Update to Table 3.4A of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations,
INST. OF GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS (Oct. 2011),
http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Trends%20in%20Racial%20Attitudes_3-4A.pdf.
228. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 223, at 156–57 tbl.3.4A.
229. 2011 Update to Table 3.4A of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations,
supra note 227.
230. 2011 Update to Table 3.4B of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations, INST.
OF GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS (Oct. 2011),
http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Trends%20in%20Racial%20Attitudes_3-4B-Sup.pdf.
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racial attitudes toward blacks in many areas, but even this outcome
should be taken with a grain of salt. Any survey is subject to the problem
of response bias.231
2.

Implicit Bias Distorts Decisions Throughout the Criminal Justice
System

a.

Overview on Implicit Bias

The criminal justice system involves numerous actors—such as police
officers, prosecutors, judges, jurors, and eyewitnesses—whose decisions
and judgments have a significant impact on the conviction and
punishment of criminal defendants. A great deal of research has shown
that race significantly affects the decisions and judgments of most
people. Some of this research has been conducted on particular actors
within the criminal justice system. For example, the research on bias
tends to show that a juror who associates blacks (as opposed to whites)
with a particular crime will be more likely to convict blacks (as opposed
to whites) of that crime on the same evidence.232 These biases are subtle
phenomena that have some influence in any given case, but which have
their most substantial effects over time. Biased decision-making
artificially inflates the proportion of minorities in the criminal justice
system, which likely creates more stereotypes and associations, thus
resulting in a negative feedback cycle.
The research and studies discussed below are either well-recognized
meta-analyses233 or particular studies selected for their relevance,
elegance, clarity, and methodological rigor. Unfortunately, much of the
research to date has evaluated race as a white-black dichotomy.234
Nevertheless, the studies that have expanded the race evaluation to other
minority groups have tended to show similar results.235 Thus, no
231. Response bias can be produced by such things as question wording, question context, race of
the interviewer, and privacy. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 223, at 78–79 (addressing the
wording of questions); Maria Krysan, Privacy and the Expression of White Racial Attitudes: A
Comparison Across Three Contexts, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 506, 525, 536 (1998) (addressing the
privacy effect); Cynthia Webster, Hispanic and Anglo Interviewer and Respondent Ethnicity and
Gender: The Impact on Survey Response Quality, 33 J. MARKETING RES. 62, 63, 70 (1996)
(addressing the race and ethnicity of interviewers and respondents).
232. See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
233. We use the term “meta-analysis” to mean an evaluation of large collections of similar
studies that is used to determine the general state of knowledge regarding a particular issue.
234. See, e.g., SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 223.
235. Compare William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing of
Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 83 (2004) (comparing reactions to black and white faces
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distinction between minority groups is drawn here, and further treatment
of that issue is beyond the scope of this report.
b.

Implicit Biases Are Pervasive

Survey data often fail to reflect “true” attitudes, especially when
people wish to conceal their motives or if they have unconscious biases.
In one carefully designed experiment, researchers found that when
offered a choice of two rooms in which movies were playing, people
avoided the room with a disabled person, but only when doing so could
masquerade as movie preference.236 This experiment and others like it237
suggest that if people can act in a biased matter with plausible
deniability, they will do so.
The gap between true attitudes and what is expressed is exacerbated
by the problem of unconscious or implicit bias. Much of this research is
done in connection with the Implicit Association Test (IAT), discussed
below, which measures reaction times in response to certain visual
stimuli.238 Other methodologies include testing subjects while
“measuring cardiovascular response, micro-facial movements, or
neurological activity.”239
The general findings, confirmed by hundreds of articles in peerreviewed scientific journals, are that “[i]mplicit biases—by which we
mean implicit attitudes and stereotypes—are both pervasive (most
individuals show evidence of some biases), and large in magnitude,
statistically speaking. In other words, we are not, on average or
generally, cognitively colorblind.”240

and finding bias in favor of white faces), and Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for
White Americans Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL.
316 (2000) (comparing reactions to photos of black and white Americans and finding implicit bias
in favor of white Americans), with Jaihyun Park et al., Implicit Attitudes Toward Arab-Muslims and
the Moderating Effects of Social Information, 29 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 35 (2007)
(comparing reactions to Arab and Muslim names and white names and finding strong bias in favor
of white names).
236. Melvin L. Snyder et al., Avoidance of the Handicapped: An Attributional Ambiguity
Analysis, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2297, 2297 (1979).
237. Id. at 2304 (discussing bystander intervention experiments varying race of victim).
238. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464–66 (1998).
239. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58
UCLA L. REV. 465, 471 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
240. Id. at 473.
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Implicit Bias Research on Race and Crime

Individuals in our society generally associate minorities with
criminality;241 they also exhibit implicit bias against minorities242 and
display divergent behavior in experiments based on the manipulation of
race as a variable (such as the race of a face in a photograph, the race of
a character in a vignette, or even the race of an experimenter).243
Researchers have shown that whites tend to exhibit relatively increased
levels of activation in the amygdala—an area of the brain that is
associated with emotional stimulation and fear—when presented with
black as opposed to white faces.244 This effect has been correlated with
performance on the IAT, which measures implicit conceptual
associations and has been used by researchers to measure implicit bias in
individuals.245 The IAT presents individuals with words or images from
two distinct dichotomies (such as good-bad and white-black), asks
individuals to sort the words and images according to assigned pairings
(e.g., hit one button for each good word or black image presented, and
hit another button for each bad word or white image presented), and then
measures the speed and accuracy with which the individuals are able to
sort the paired concepts. Whites generally exhibit implicit bias against
blacks under the IAT.246 Namely, whites tend to exhibit less speed and
accuracy when asked to associate positive concepts with black (as
opposed to white) faces or names. In certain studies, the IAT in
particular also has been correlated with biased behavior and decisionmaking.247
Researchers have made other findings regarding mental associations

241. Harris et al., supra note 129, at 241; see also infra notes 253–257 and accompanying text.
See generally Kelly Welch, Black Criminal Stereotypes and Racial Profiling, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM.
JUST. 276 (2007).
242. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 955–56, 957–58 tbls.1 & 2 (2006); see also infra notes 246–247 and
accompanying text.
243. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.d–f.
244. Phelps et al., supra note 18, at 729–33.
245. See id.
246. Id. at 730–31; see also Greenwald et al., supra note 238, at 1474.
247. See Jeremy D. Heider & John J. Skowronski, Improving the Predictive Validity of the
Implicit Association Test, 9 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 53, 71–72 (2007) (examining the extent to which
IAT measures of racial attitudes predict social behaviors); Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold,
Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of
Racial Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 440 (2001) (using IAT to measure
intergroup prejudice between white and black undergraduates).
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of blacks with criminality. In one study, individuals primed248 with
crime-related concepts more quickly identified computer imposed “dotprobe[s]” on black faces than white faces.249 The individuals primed
with crime-related concepts also identified the dot probe more quickly
than their nonprimed counterparts,250 an effect that was replicated among
a group of police officers.251 Further, when asked whether faces “looked
criminal,” a racially diverse group of police officers judged black faces
to be much more criminal-looking.252
d.

Criminal Investigations and Arrests Are Influenced by the Race of
Potential/Actual Suspects, and Often Are Based on a Faulty
Application of Majoritarian Cultural Norms

The racial component of a given case may influence judgments of
character and guilt, expectations of recidivism, and decisions to arrest
and charge. In one study, priming police and probation officers with
black-related concepts significantly influenced responses to race-neutral
vignettes of juveniles committing theft and assault.253 Specifically, the
officers were more likely to rate the juveniles negatively, to expect
recidivism, and to recommend arresting the juveniles if primed with
black-related concepts, such as “homeboy” or “minority.”254 Another
study observed that white store employees were more likely to monitor
and follow black (as opposed to white) customers who asked to try on
sunglasses with a security sensor removed.255
Additionally, researchers have conducted many deadly force
simulations in which subjects must decide quickly whether to shoot or
not shoot figures appearing on a screen who are carrying either a gun or
an innocuous object (such as a wallet). Whites have been shown to
248. “Priming” occurs when a subject is shown an image or word so quickly that the image or
word is not registered in consciousness, but nevertheless has a subconscious impact and affects
behavior. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 880 (2004); Erin J. Strahan et al., Subliminal Priming and
Persuasion: Striking While the Iron Is Hot, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 556, 556 (2001).
This is a common and accepted method of investigating underlying mental processes in the field of
social psychology.
249. Eberhardt et al., supra note 248, at 882–83.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 885–87.
252. Id. at 889.
253. Graham & Lowery, supra note 17, at 487–88, 494, 499.
254. Id. at 489, 491–97.
255. George E. Schreer et al., “Shopping While Black”: Examining Racial Discrimination in a
Retail Setting, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1432, 1439 (2009).
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commit more errors regarding black (as opposed to white) target
figures.256 Another such deadly force study was conducted at the
University of Washington with similar results.257 This bias effect
increased in one study when subjects read newspaper articles involving
black (as opposed to white) criminals prior to testing—once again
showing the power of underlying stereotyping.258
Researchers have also studied whether nonverbal cues used by police
officers to identify likely suspects, such as eye contact and body
language, are accurate across races.259 Research has shown that
minorities—including minorities who have not been engaging in
criminal activity—disproportionately exhibit many of these nonverbal
cues (such as pauses in speech or avoidance of eye contact).260 These
same behaviors also have been shown in foreign language speakers.261
e.

Determinations of Guilt and Sentencing Likely Are Influenced by
the Race of Defendants, in Conjunction with Other Extra-Legal
Factors

Researchers have conducted some substantial meta-analyses
regarding mock juror studies involving race. In these studies, subjects
are provided with trial materials and asked for judgments of guilt and
sentencing, and defendant race is manipulated. These studies are limited
in various ways—for example, they generally evaluate individual mock
jurors, as opposed to mock juries engaged in group decision-making—
but they appear useful nonetheless.
One meta-analysis focused on sentencing decisions made by white
mock jurors found a narrow racial bias in sentencing against people of
color.262 Another meta-analysis evaluated verdict and sentencing
decisions made by mock jurors (including black mock jurors) in mock
cases involving minority defendants, finding no significant effect of
racial bias (although there were apparent effects within particular types

256. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1325 (2002).
257. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to
Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 399–402 (2003).
258. Joshua Correll et al., The Influence of Stereotypes on Decisions to Shoot, 37 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1102, 1114 (2007).
259. Engel & Johnson, supra note 17; Johnson, supra note 17, at 280, 286.
260. Engel & Johnson, supra note 17, at 612 tbl.3.
261. Id. at 613.
262. Sweeney & Haney, supra note 17, at 191–93.
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of crime).263 A subsequent meta-analysis collected more studies and
evaluated the effect of out-group bias, including bias by black mock
jurors against white mock defendants.264 That meta-analysis found a
“small, but significant” effect of race on mock juror verdict and
sentencing decisions, which was substantially tempered both by jury
instructions and use of binary responses regarding guilt (guilty or not
guilty, as opposed to a scale measuring likelihood of guilt).265 These
tempering conditions are more realistic and reflective of actual
courtroom processes, and thus, based on mock juror research to date, the
effect of racial bias on jury decisions in general appears to be fairly
insignificant.
However, subsequent research has shown that race may play a
significant role in particular types of criminal cases, or when combined
with other factors. For instance, some studies have found a substantial
effect of racial bias for crimes stereotypically associated with a
particular race—for example, relatively higher guilty ratings for whites
charged with embezzlement or blacks charged with motor vehicle
theft.266 Another study evaluated the interaction of defendant race,
socioeconomic status, and attorney race on mock juror evaluations.
Although no factor was individually significant, the three factors
combined were highly significant; all else being equal, the Mexican,
poor defendant with a Mexican attorney was judged guilty by 55% of
jurors, while the white, rich defendant with a white attorney was judged
guilty by only 32% of jurors.267
f.

Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification Is Substantially Less
Accurate, and Cross-Racial Lineup Construction Is Less Fair

The “cross-race bias” eyewitness phenomenon is the finding that
“[e]yewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members of their
263. Mazzella & Feingold, supra note 17, at 1325.
264. Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic
Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 621 (2005).
265. Id. at 629.
266. Randall A. Gordon et al., Perceptions of Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The Effect of
Defendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 128 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 195 (2001); Christopher
S. Jones & Martin F. Kaplan, The Effects of Racially Stereotypical Crimes on Juror DecisionMaking and Information-Processing Strategies, 25 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 5–7, 9
(2003).
267. Russ K.E. Espinoza & Cynthia Willis-Esqueda, Defendant and Defense Attorney
Characteristics and Their Effects on Juror Decision Making and Prejudice Against Mexican
Americans, 14 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 364, 367–68 tbls.1 & 2
(2008).

04 - WLR March 2012 Task Force Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

3/15/2012 11:17 AM

RACE & WASHINGTON’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

47

own race than members of other races.”268 In a survey of sixty-four
eminent experts on eyewitness research, 90% agreed that the cross-race
bias phenomenon is reliable enough to be presented in court.269 Further,
a comprehensive and well-regarded meta-analysis of studies regarding
cross-racial eyewitness identification found that cross-racial
identifications are 1.56 times more likely to be erroneous than same-race
identifications.270 Considering the important role that eyewitness
testimony plays in criminal trials, this incongruity is disturbing.
Similarly, another study found that cross-racial lineup constructions
(lineups constructed by individuals of a different race than the suspect)
are likely to be done with less time and attention to detail in selecting
foils and are therefore less fair.271
3.

Bias and Outcomes

Research also demonstrates that bias, whether conscious or
unconscious, affects behaviors. In one study, résumés were sent to 1250
employers who had advertised that they were hiring.272 The résumés
were altered so that some résumés had stereotypically white-sounding
names while others had stereotypically black-sounding names. Each
prospective employer received four résumés from the researchers: “an
average white applicant, an average black applicant, a highly skilled
white applicant, and a highly skilled black applicant.”273 Much to the
surprise of the researchers,
the résumés with white-sounding names triggered 50 percent
more callbacks than résumés with black-sounding names.
Furthermore, the researchers found that the high-quality black
résumés drew no more calls than the average black résumés.
Highly skilled candidates with white names got more calls than
average white candidates, but lower-skilled candidates with
white names got many more callbacks than even highly skilled

268. Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A
New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 408 tbl.1 (2001).
269. Id. at 407, 410.
270. Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias
in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 15 (2001).
271. John C. Brigham & David J. Ready, Own-Race Bias in Lineup Construction, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 415, 422–23 (1985).
272. Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at W12, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27067-2005Jan21.html.
273. Id.
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black applicants.274
While this study involved fictitious black and white applicants in an
employment setting, its implications are of significant concern for the
criminal justice system, where a significant body of research has
confirmed the presence of bias and disparate outcomes.
A difficulty remains, though, with connecting bias to behavior to
particular outcomes. Absent an admission from an officer who was
motivated by bias, blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans who are
stopped and searched while driving their cars cannot prove
discrimination. Yet more blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans are
searched, even though statistically, those individuals are less likely to be
in possession of narcotics.275
Because of the cumulative effect of facially neutral policies that have
disproportionate impacts, and because of the subtle operation of bias at
various decision points, a disproportionate number of people of color in
Washington State find themselves incarcerated or otherwise involved
with the criminal justice system—a disproportion that cannot be fully
accounted for by involvement in crime.
Further, due to the difficulties in proving intent and the limits of
current antidiscrimination laws,276 many of the solutions to the problem
of bias in the criminal justice system will have to come from outside of
the courtroom. The research shows that implicit racial bias is not an
unavoidable component of human decision-making. Substantial research
has begun to determine the most effective methods of minimizing such
bias.277 Implicit-bias research should inform policymaking and training
within the criminal justice system, albeit with great care and
consideration.278
274. Id.
275. Pickerill et al., supra note 194, at 13 tbl.3.
276. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How to Do Equality, in THE CONSTITUTION
IN 2020, at 94, 94–99 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
277. See, e.g., Sophie Lebrecht et al., Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Racial
Bias, PLOS ONE, Jan. 2009, at e4215, at 1, 4–5 (concluding that training in distinguishing otherrace faces decreases bias shown in IAT); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the
Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and
Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803, 804 fig.1 (2001) (concluding
that exposure to images of liked and disliked members of racial groups affects performance on
IAT).
278. See, e.g., Dale Larson, A Fair and Implicitly Impartial Jury: An Argument for Administering
the Implicit Association Test During Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 139, 169 (2010)
(“[M]ake the IAT universal in jury assembly rooms . . . and test jurors for the categories most likely
to generate bias that could play a role in the cases scheduled for the day . . . .”); Gary L. Wells &
Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What Do We Do About It?,
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IV. CONCLUSION
A time comes when silence is betrayal.
—Martin Luther King, Jr., 1967
There is a problem in our justice system.
In this Report, we find that race and racial bias affect outcomes in the
criminal justice system and matter in ways that are not fair, that increase
disparity in incarceration rates, that do not advance legitimate public
safety objectives, and that undermine public confidence in our criminal
justice system. We have presented evidence of racial and ethnic
disproportionality and disparities in the criminal justice system. Arrest
and conviction rates do not correlate precisely with criminal behavior
rates and cannot serve as a proxy for criminality. Much of the
disproportionality cannot be explained by legitimate race-neutral factors.
Put simply, we have found disparity and mistrust. Together, we must
fix it for the sake of our democracy.
Our democracy is based on the rule of law and faith in the fairness of
the justice system. This faith is undermined by disparity and by highprofile incidents of violence toward people of color by law
enforcement.279 The problem is not a “people of color” problem. It is our
problem as a society to address.
We, the Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, are
devoted to reducing racial disparity in the justice system. Existence
would be intolerable were we never to dream. We dream of completely
eliminating bias in criminal, civil, juvenile, and family law matters. But
there is a long history of overpromising and underdelivering. We ask
that you join us with energy and goodwill, so we are not added to this
list of failures. We prefer the folly of enthusiasm to the indifference of
wisdom from those who purport to know better.
We ask that you trust only action because progress happens at the
level of events, not of words. Please join our effort to address bias in the
justice system at every level. We have hope because we are united and
committed to working collaboratively despite our differences. We
celebrate the efforts of this Task Force to work together to build a
community based on trust, equality, and respect.

7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 230, 241–43 (2001) (suggesting more lineup foils and own-race
lineup construction in cases of other-race eyewitness identification).
279. Steve Miletich, SPD Officer Charged with Assault in Videotaped Kicking, SEATTLE TIMES
(Apr. 13, 2011), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2014766865_officercharged14m.
html.

